The usual way to imagine weaponised AI is that somebody hijacks it. Someone breaks into the system, takes over the device and turns it in the wrong direction. That can happen, and there are examples: United States border patrol drones were hijacked in 2015 because the positioning signal was not encrypted, and spoofing satellite positioning has been demonstrated in research many times over.
But hijacking is the wrong worry, and the reason is interesting. What displaced it has already happened.
Satellite positioning is in practice jammed in the current war. Between the start of the war and March 2026, Lloyd’s List Intelligence recorded 1,735 jamming events affecting 655 vessels. When the radio link and positioning are lost, a drone falls. The answer, however, was not a better link but that no link is needed any more.
The Ukrainian company Twist Robotics builds a system that locates the device with a camera, by comparing the view to mapped terrain features, without a satellite. In September 2025 Vyriy Drone and The Fourth Law began serial production of FPV drones that carry their own terminal-phase target seeking on board. Once the operator has locked the target, the device’s own computer takes it there even if the link is cut.
Then comes the point that settles this matter, and it is not technical but economic. The module raises the price of a drone by about ten per cent and improves accuracy, according to the manufacturer, by a factor of two to four. The unit price is about 450 dollars. In September 2025 the companies estimated that most front-line drones would have a comparable system within six to nine months.
No regulation competes with that price.
Here it is worth being precise about what autonomy means in these devices. A human still chooses the target. The machine handles the last stretch, after the lock has been made. That is not the same thing as a weapon that seeks its target itself, and the distinction is blurred in the reporting constantly.
The gap is narrowing, though. In February 2026 Ukraine’s minister for strategic industries reported successful swarm trials in which seven groups demonstrated a system where one operator directs dozens of drones that plan their actions among themselves. One human, dozens of devices, and the division of labour between them is a matter for the machines.
The best known claim of a wholly independent killing still dates from 2020. According to the report of the UN panel of experts on Libya, the Turkish Kargu-2 tracked and struck retreating forces without a link being needed between operator and munition. In headlines this became the first killing carried out by AI on its own. The report does not, however, confirm that the device was operating in autonomous mode at the moment of the strike, and it does not confirm that anyone died in it. The manufacturer and Turkey have not opened up the technical details. Six years later, the field’s most cited example is therefore still unconfirmed.
That is the recurring pattern with this subject. The real change looks nothing like what one would imagine, and that is why it goes through.
Nobody hijacks anything. Jamming forced the machines to manage without a link to a human, and every step in that direction also reduces the human ability to interrupt. That is not a side effect but the entire sales argument: the device works even when the link is cut. The ability to call something off and the ability to continue despite jamming are the same property seen from different directions.
And this is done openly. Not as something escaped from a laboratory, but to order, on a budget and with approval.
Regulation knew about this in time. The UN Secretary-General asked states to complete an agreement on autonomous weapons systems by the end of 2026. In November 2025 a General Assembly resolution was supported by 156 states. This autumn’s expert negotiations nevertheless ended without a binding agreement, and the matter moved to November’s review conference, which will decide only whether actual negotiations are to begin.
The deadline is this year, then, and by then what can be decided is mainly whether the matter will be discussed at all.
In my previous piece I asked how much we ought to be able to see before someone reports it themselves. On this subject everything has been reported. Prices, technical specifications and production volumes are public, and they are used as sales arguments. That has done nothing about it.